Despite denying repeatedly that he played a ‘sexing up game’ when working on the government’s much-criticised dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, Alastair Campbell acknowledged in his evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry (12.1.2010) that his role had been unprecedented.
Never before had a party political spin doctor chaired meetings of Britain’s intelligence chiefs nor had a Downing Street press secretary previously had access to secret intelligence information which he did not require to see on a ‘need to know’ basis.Cameron justified the exceptional degree of influence which he had exercised over the presentation of the dossier on the grounds that Tony Blair was having to come to terms with the rapidly changing nature of the news media and the growth of twenty four hour news.Blair wanted Campbell to ensure that a ‘communications strategy’ was embedded in the presentation of the government’s case against Saddam Hussein and that led to the unprecedented decision in September 2002 to publish a dossier on intelligence information about weapons of mass destruction.Campbell wrote the first draft to the forward of the dossier which said the intelligence had assessed ‘beyond doubt’ that Saddam Hussein continued to produce chemical and biological weapons and a nuclear capability.It was put to Campbell by Inquiry member Baroness Usha Prashar that the innovation of publishing a dossier had ‘blurred the lines’ of constitutional propriety because intelligence material should have been kept separate from decision making process and the presentation of government policy on Iraq.Campbell justified the dossier on the grounds that intelligence information had to become more involved in public communication. It was a response to the changing media landscape and the fact that the public and the media would not accept simply the word of the Prime Minister.‘I think the process was rigorous...the integrity was strong and profound and we are only having this discussion because of the subsequent controversy over an utterly dishonest piece of journalism’. (A reference to Andrew Gilligan’s report for the BBC that Campbell had ‘sexed up’ the dossier).Earlier in response to questions from Sir Roderic Lyne, Campbell accepted that his role chairing Downing Street meetings with intelligence chiefs and having access to secret intelligence information which the Downing Street press secretary did not require to see on a ‘need to know’ basis was unprecedented.Campbell said the publication of the dossier was a response to changed media culture. When he was a journalist (on the Daily Mirror) and the government said it did not comment on intelligence matters, journalists tended to accept the position; that approach was no longer tenable.‘The dossier was an exercise in openness, in trying to share with the public information which is sensitive; so that the public could be informed...that was the thinking behind it.’John Scarlett, the chairman of the joint intelligence committee, who had ‘ownership’ of the dossier, asked Campbell for presentational support and advice. ‘I was chairing the meetings because the Prime Minister would be presenting the paper to parliament, there would be massive media interest around the world and it was absolutely necessary I should have done that. I was the person who was charged by the Prime Minister to advise on all presentational aspects of the dossier’. Campbell denied that he had been part of a ‘sexing up game’ to strengthen the dossier. At no point did he seek to over-ride, over-write or sex up the intelligence. ‘I was being accused of distorting the intelligence, forcing intelligence officials to do things which they don’t want to do; that is untrue...I defend every single word of the dossier and every single part of the process. I think it was a genuine attempt by the Prime Minster and the government to engage the public properly in understanding his concerns about the growing threat posed by Saddam Hussein’.When challenged by Sir Roderic Lyne over why the Prime Minister’s foreword had used the words established ‘beyond doubt’ about weapons of mass destruction, Campbell denied that parliament had been misled: ‘I do stand by the words ‘beyond doubt’...that was the judgement the Prime Minister was led to make by the intelligence information’.Although Baroness Prashar did suggest that the dossier had ‘blurred the lines’ over the need to keep intelligence information away from the presentation of government decision making, Campbell was not probed any further about the subsequent changes made by Blair’s successor Gordon Brown who in 2007 decreed that party political spin doctors should no longer play any part in the preparation of intelligence information which might be presented to the public. Campbell’s final plea to the inquiry was that he hoped governments did not revert to the ‘old fashioned communications’ mindset which ignored the impact of both twenty four hour news and embedded news which allowed the media to give ‘a snap shot here, a snap shot there’. Governments should not forget it is their role to ‘show the big picture’. His parting shot was a classic Campbell riposte: ‘The integrity and professionalism of the dossier I would defend to the end of my days’. Nicholas Jones 12.1.2010